The need to turn an enemy into an adversary is an ethical obligation. I try to show that this obligation has multiple religious and philosophical resources. The ethical imperative also requires us to not overstate and magnify any problem at hand to the point that it becomes insurmountable and enmity becomes an end in itself. I do ask the question whether Springs thinks of Colin Kaepernick’s peaceful protest by taking the knee at football games as an instance of healthy conflict. (...) Are the terms peace and healthy conflict perhaps not better viewed as allegories for the interrogation of the human condition? Perhaps healthy conflict remains a series of questions rather than concrete outcomes. (shrink)

Reasons are not the same. Normative reasons need to be distinguished from non-normative reasons. Then, due to some considerations, we have to draw a distinction between explanatory reasons and motivating reasons. In this paper, I focus on a rather implicit assumption in drawing the explanatory-motivating distinction. Motivating reasons are mostly characterized as those reasons that the agent takes to be normative. This may imply that the agent always knows the reasons their motivating reasons. This I call the infallibility or transparency (...) assumption. This suggests that there is some sort of report condition on motivating reasons. In contrast, one may ask whether it is possible for the agent to be mistaken about what their motivating reasons are. I argue that we can distinguish motivating reasons and satisfy the motivations for the explanatory-motivating distinction without committing to this infallibility assumption. I briefly sketch a character-based approach to motivating reasons as an alternative. Next, I argue that, in addition to being important on its own, this account has implications for other debates. I illustrate this by mentioning cases such as recalcitrant actions as well as critically discussing one kind of counter-example presented against the guise of the good thesis. (shrink)

Various theories concerning how to speak positively about God have been proposed. One such theory, the theory of complete univocity, states that although the mode of existence between God and human beings is different, there are, in principle, ontological commonalities between God and humans in existence and His attributes. These ontological commonalities make it possible to attribute a single meaning to both God and human beings univocally. In this article, it is attempted to both explain and defend the theory of (...) complete univocity, while also critiquing the theory of partial univocity, a theory which believes solely in semantic univocity and ontologically assumes that God is absolutely different and separate from humans. Further, as the commonality of meaning between God and humans requires the existence of an ontological commonality between them, the theory of analogy is also not acceptable. Because, firstly, the denial of shared attributes between God and humans has many unsatisfactory theological implications. Secondly, there is no middle term between univocity and equivocality. Therefore, the only theologically defensible theory is that of complete univocity. (shrink)

One of the premises of the argument from design is the need for the order of a designer. This premise has been explained in various ways, one of which is the calculus of probabilities. It posits that the likelihood of an ordered thing coming into existence by chance is so low that human beings consider it nearly impossible; therefore, this order requires an intelligent designer. However, some contemporary Muslim philosophers, such as Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī, along with certain Western philosophers, have (...) contested the validity of the calculus of probabilities. They argue that the calculus of probabilities does not reveal reality but is merely practically useful. They assert that undesigned states have the same probability as designed states. In this article, I address these objections, refute them, and ultimately demonstrate the soundness of the argument from design based on the calculus of probabilities. (shrink)

Conscientious Sociology is an introductory but essential step towards the recognition of paradigmatic contestations and shifts in the post-1970s Social Sciences. It develops an ideal typology of three major paradigms, i.e. the Foundationalist, the Relativist and the Critical-Conscientious Paradigms by discussing and comparing their principles in four Meta-Theoretical domains: Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology, and Axiology. Hosseini, in his book, shows how the Conscientious paradigm deals with well known dilemmas which are not effectively resolved by two other paradigms; dilemmas like how (...) to create an objective account of reality whereas the subjectivities of actors and investigators are accommodated or what relationship must be set up between quantitative and qualitative methods. The book also further discusses the principles that Conscientious sociologist are expected to consider when engaging in empirical research. It finally, provides its readers with a unique perspective adopted from a radical Iranian social thinker, Ali Shariati whose ideas are portrayed as an insightful exemplar for Iranian critical sociologists. The book also contributes to the growing debates around the nature and future of critical sociology in the West by adding a Southern perspective. (shrink)

The practice of assigning authorship for a scientific publication tends to raise two normative questions: 1) ‘who should be credited as an author?’; 2) ‘who should not be credited as an author but should still be acknowledged?’. With the publication of the revised version of The European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (ECCRI), standard answers to these questions have been called into question. This article examines the ways in which the ECCRI approaches these two questions and compares these approaches (...) to standard definitions of ‘authorship’ and ‘acknowledgment’ in guidelines issued by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) and the World Association of Medical Editors (WAME). In light of two scenarios and the problems posed by these kinds of ‘real-world’ examples, we recommend specific revisions to the content of the ECCRI in order not only to provide a more detailed account of the tasks deserving of acknowledgment, but to improve the Code’s current definition of authorship. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers of mind disagree with substance dualism, saying that despite the failure of physical theories of mind, substance dualism cannot be advocated, because it faces more serious problems than physical theories, lacking compatibility with philosophical arguments and scientific evidence. Regardless of the validity of the arguments in support of substance dualism, it is demonstrated in this article that this theory is coherent, with no philosophical or scientific problems. The main arguments of opponents of substance dualism are explained and (...) criticized in this respect. Based on this, it becomes clear that the interaction of soul and body has a reasonable philosophical explanation, the problem of the pairing of soul and body, although it may not have a scientific explanation, it has a philosophical and theological solution, the principle of the physical causal closure lacks conclusive reasons and cannot reject the existence of the soul, the existence of the soul does not contradict the theory of evolution, the dependence of the soul on the brain is compatible with its independence, and finally, the principle of simplicity does not make any problem for accepting the substance dualism. (shrink)

The literature on the problem of evil does not draw enough upon the relevant debates in (meta)ethics, and ethical theorists (broadly understood) can engage with the problem of evil as a way of inquiry in their field. I review how the problem of evil is essentially formed based on (evaluative and deontic) ethical judgments, and how responses to it, either theistic or atheistic, are mainly based on the relevant ethical judgments. Meanwhile, though contemporary debates in metaphysics and epistemology have influenced (...) the literature on the problem of evil, the same does not hold true for ethics. This suggests that there are ways to engage with the problem of evil as doing axiology or ethical theory more generally, which may be fruitful regardless of their being theodicy. I end by briefly discussing an example focused on the idea of moral progress. (shrink)

All previous solutions to the problem of evil have attempted to resolve the issue by showing that God permits them in order for a greater good. However, some contest that there are some instances in which there is no greater good, while in other cases good and evil have been distributed unjustly. I intend, in this paper, to show that if God compensates the harms of evil in the afterlife, any sort of good is enough to resolve the problem of (...) evil; even if the good is not greater than the evil nor distributed appropriately. To attain this end, I have divided the theory of compensation into a weak and a more effective account. The weak account alleges that the goodness of evils is merely based upon their compensation in the afterlife. I have proposed, in this article, a new, strong account of this theory, which considers both primary goods of evils and afterlife compensation as combined elements that can justify evils. After distinguishing the weak and strong versions of compensation, the idea is explained, and the advantages of the theory are pointed out. Finally, there are two chief objections raised against the validity of this theory, both have been mentioned and answered in this paper. (shrink)

All previous solutions to the problem of evil have attempted to resolve the issue by showing that God permits them in order for a greater good. However, some contest that there are some instances in which there is no greater good, while in other cases good and evil have been distributed unjustly. I intend, in this paper, to show that if God compensates the harms of evil in the afterlife, any sort of good is enough to resolve the problem of (...) evil; even if the good is not greater than the evil nor distributed appropriately. To attain this end, I have divided the theory of compensation into a weak and a more effective account. The weak account alleges that the goodness of evils is merely based upon their compensation in the afterlife. I have proposed, in this article, a new, strong account of this theory, which considers both primary goods of evils and afterlife compensation as combined elements that can justify evils. After distinguishing the weak and strong versions of compensation, the idea is explained, and the advantages of the theory are pointed out. Finally, there are two chief objections raised against the validity of this theory, both have been mentioned and answered in this paper. (shrink)

Some analogous higher-order versions of Skolem’s paradox will be introduced. The generalizability of two solutions for Skolem’s paradox will be assessed: the course-book approach and Bays’ one. Bays’ solution to Skolem’s paradox, unlike the course-book solution, can be generalized to solve the higher-order paradoxes without any implication about the possibility or order of a language in which mathematical practice is to be formalized.

This article tries to examine Husserl's theory of signification and reference, while presenting a content-oriented view of theory of intentionality and proposing the theory of the ideality of meaning, and thus explores the relation between Being and consciousness under the category of "objectivity" in logical investigation; Because the relationship between Being and consciousness must be sought at the intersection of theory of intentionality and objectivity. This intersection can be proposed in the truth condition of the objectivity of meaning, which acts (...) as the decisive result of Husserl's theory of signification and reference; to this reason, after presenting Husserl's critique of Brentano's causal theory of intentionality, this paper introduces a adverbial reading of theory of intentionality which is Husserl's specific theory of intentionality in logical investigation. According to this theory, the subject always pays attention to the object from his perspective, and this is called the perspectival subjectivity, which is the intrinsic characteristic of the subject. We will then show that the theory of the ideality of meaning is the result of the threefold structure of Husserl's intentionality and the content-oriented view of intentionality. Contrary to the claim of this theory that its true and inherent characteristic is intentionally its phenomenological aspect, the theory of reference and its corresponding meaning cannot satisfy the condition of the objectivity of meaning; Thus, theory of intentionality is based on an inadequate content-oriented attitude. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being. Historically, ways of being are aligned with the ontological categories. This paper is about to investigate why there is such a connection, and how it should be understood. Ontological pluralism suffers from an objection, according to which ontological pluralism collapses into ontological monism, i.e., there is only one way to be. Admitting to ontological categories can save ontological pluralism from this objection if ways of being ground ontological categories. (...) -/- . (shrink)

This Paper attempts to Jude the axiology of Aristotle’s Philosophy based on Aristotelian Philosophy. For this Purpose, we will first Prove axiology as a kind of knowledge and then we will study the relation between axiology and two others knowledge domains, that is, ontology and epistemology. We will demonstrate that values like goodness and beauty, are same final cause and formal cause for explanation of values of every thing. At least, in the nature, goodness and beauty are the idea of (...) reality which is Present in every things. Although values Such as beauty and splendor, good and bad exist in relation with us. Indeed, Such values don’t have objective being nor ideal existence. Form epistemology Point of view, the values are known with their formal Cause ,that is, with their general form. In Aristotle’s axiology the concept of the end(Telos) is a fundamental concept which shows that the Aristotle’s Philosophy system is a coherent system. thus Aristotle maintains to ontological and epistemological aspects of the values. Also He has even considered hierarchy of value for creatures, knowledge and values itself. Thus , every thing lied in the hierarchy of valuation which has roots in the concept of the end. It also shows that Aristotle either in the position of philosopher or the position of valuation cannot be free from the valuation of ontology and epistemology. Whit such approach, the second section of the paper attempts to show that the end in Aristotle’s Ethic is Idea of perfect that the human attempts to reach happiness in accordance whit the most complete and the most excellent of the virtue and every one should take care of domination of reason over human behavior and whit continuous practice and one can accomplish the virtues whit no extreme this way, all ethic virtues will be obtained by trusting to one’s capability. (shrink)

This article introduces the concept of ‘well-living’ as a transformative framework for reimagining quality of life in the face of current global socio-ecological challenges. Through a reflexive theoretical meta-analysis, it critically examines mainstream and reformist well-being discourses while drawing inspiration from transformative perspectives found in recent post-capitalist and indigenous movements. ‘Well-living’ is portrayed as both a civilizational endeavor and a multifaceted imperative, encompassing dimensions of creativity, liveability, conviviality, and alterity across various scales from individual to international contexts. Central to the (...) ‘well-living’ paradigm are nine key qualities, including harmonious coexistence, aspirational foresight and purposefulness, solidarity, autonomy, authenticity, and integrity, thereby promoting an integrated approach to living in balance with oneself, others, and the natural world. Embracing ‘well-living’ as a goal and process can empower individuals and communities to challenge prevailing global capitalist paradigms, re-establish connections with the interconnected web of life, and strive for a more just, regenerative, and diverse world, accommodating multiple perspectives. Lastly, employing a 'commonist' perspective, the article outlines essential institutional and legislative-policy changes required to actualize the vision of 'well-living.'. (shrink)

The history of political ideas and the logic behind its development is the most complicated section of the general history of thought in the Islamic Era. The first question raised in our critical study of the history of political ideas is the Jollowing: what is the domain of Iranian civilization at the Islamic period? The answer to this question would have a philosophical coloring. The author of this article has tried to answer this question neatly. The second question raised in (...) the paper is the following: Is political discourse based on philosophical discourse? In sum, the author has dealt with different facets of the history of political ideas in the domains of Iranian civilization at the time of the Islamic Era. Preface The history of political ideas! and the logic behind its development is the most complicated and gloomy section of the general history of thought in the Islamic Era. (shrink)

Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any (...) difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. (shrink)

The nature and characteristics of traditional art have always been controversial, and Frithjof Schuon, as one of the leading figures of the traditionalist movement, has made many claims in this regard. One of the ways to investigate philosophical issues is to clarify concepts by providing the necessary and sufficient conditions, which has been widely used in the contemporary philosophy of art. This paper, which has been done by descriptive-analytical method, tries to introduce the necessary and sufficient conditions for a supposed (...) work of art to be categorized under the category of "traditional art" by referring to Schuon's works. The results show that the three conditions of "symbolic expression of intellectual realities", "being functional and useful" and "conformity of form, raw materials, and symbolism with the rules of traditional art" can be considered as necessary conditions and together as a sufficient condition for an artwork to be "traditional" from Schuon's point of view. (shrink)

Practical research, according to Aristotle, strives to actualize the Supreme Good as the ultimate end of life. The Final Good could be determined if preceded by an outline based on conceptual analysis. For this reason, Aristotle considers agathón (ἀγαθόν), as the universal concept of good, and clarifies its conceptual-categorical structure to explain how we can understand it. In virtue of the similarity between good and existences for their extension of senses (good has as many meanings as existences), Aristotle proceeds to (...) analyze good compared to existence as an absolute philosophical conception. Alongside his comparative study of good and existence, we can consider a metaphysics for good similar to the metaphysics of being and question its possibility. Corresponding to the metaphysics of existence that considers being qua being, one can imagine a metaphysics for good that investigates goodness qua goodness and explores its philosophical characteristics and theoretical attributes aimed at the question of its possibility. It appears, in the process of Aristotle’s analysis that there is a common meaning and central definite characteristic in several significations and different categories of being by reference to one starting point: the primary being or substance. From the categorical point of view, similarly, various categories are accidental qualities of the fundamental category of substance. Because of the one principle of the primary being or substance, a metaphysics for being which contemplates on being qua being would be possible. But good, on the contrary, is used homonymously in various different senses without any common meaning and with no reference to one principle. Of the categorical attitude, good is applied in any individual category independently with no connection with each other and by no reference to one main category. There is not, in fact, any category of primary good or substantial good which constitutes universal meaning and a single category as an appropriate subject matter for the intended knowledge of the metaphysics of good. Consequently, it is not possible to establish one primary philosophy for goodness qua goodness in the same way as the first philosophy of being as being. Knowledge, according to Aristotle, is composed of the eidos (form or essence) as a universal absolute subject and eidetic attitude as a necessary theoretical way of understanding. Eidetic view and eidos entity are based on the common meaning and single principle which are not found in the concept of good. Thus, the theoretical approach to good, which could not constitute the eidos of good and eidetic knowledge, leads to the Platonic Idea of good and the dialectical attitude. But Aristotle who does not follow dialectic, cannot obtain the eidetic path to goodness either, and, therefore, reconstructs good as the well-being which is the final good that humankind can obtain practically. So he goes on to outline good not as the good in itself which in essence necessitates theoretical cognition, but as a final good of human life that is a condition that entails practical realization. (shrink)

Sayyid Sadr al-din Mohammad Dashtaki Shirazi is the inventor of the division of composition into unified composition and composition by join. With this division, Dashtaki has expressed a new theory about the composition of the material object from first matter and form, as well as the composition of man from soul and body, and considers these compositions as an alliance and unification, not simply the parts joining to each other. In this paper, we will present Dashtaki’s arguments on the theory (...) of unified composition. We will also examine three objections to this theory and responses to them. Finally, we will examine the background of this theory in Bahmanyar's phrases. Dashtaki believes that when the components in the compound have a real plurality, i.e. each one exists separately from the other, a composition by join is created, such as the composition of a house from numerous clays. But if the components in the compound are united and none of them are separate from the others and exists actually, the resulting composition will be an alliance and union. He believes that in the unified composition, every component is identical to any other component and is identical to the whole. Accordingly, Reza is a unique being, both human and writer. In order to achieve a composition, a plurality is needed and in order to form a single composition, there must be plural components related to each other. An important question is that, principally how is a composition possible, if unified composition comes to existence only when the components are made united with each other and with the whole? In other words, unified composition is not possible, because the first condition of the acquisition of the composition, i.e., the plurality of the constituent components, is not satisfied. Dashtaki strives to express a difference between the components in the union compound. He believes that the conditions of the realization and the survival of the components are different, and that is enough for them to be different. In Dashtaki's point of view, in the unified composition the components are analytical, not being separate and plural, in reality. In other words, the components do not have actual and "in-the-world" plurality, which means that it is our intellect that separates them and looks at them as independent objects. Therefore, unity and identity are in-the-world and plurality and discernibility are analytical and in the mind. Dashtaki's first argument for his theory in general is as follows: the three major material objects (solid, plant and animal) are undoubtedly real compounds. But in these compositions, components exist potentially, and in a unified composition, components do not exist actually. Therefore, these objects are unified compounds. The second argument is that the accuracy of predication implies unity. In the unified composition, the components are identical with the whole, and therefore, the components can be predicated to the composition. In Dashtaki's view, if A is predicated to B, then it could be concluded that they are identical and unified. The first objection to this theory is that the unity is incompatible with causality. From the perspective of the Peripatetics, form is the cause of the matter, and this is incompatible with the union of the two. Dashtaki states that in case of causality, there is no need for cause and effect to be two different and discernible entities, but a single entity may be from one aspect the cause and, from another, the effect. In other words, the foresaid causality is analytical causality. When mind analyses something, and then finds analytical components, it can see between those analytical and intellectual components, causality, and find some of them as the cause of the others. The second objection is the incorrectness of the unity in compounds with components not being similar. only in the compounds having similar parts, one can accept the unity of matter and form. For example, in compounds such as horses, it is not possible to accept the union of matter and form, because in horses, there are components with different natures, such as bones, flesh and nerves. Unity of These parts with each other and with the whole is not plausible. Dashtaki’s respond is that the horse is also a natural unit and has no actual plurality. Components having similar or different natures does not make any difference. According to the theory of unified composition, the horse's components are united with the horse's form and have only analytical plurality. Horse’s components are just analytical components, not actual, independent ones. The third objection is the incompatibility of the actual existence of components with their unity. But Dashtaki maintains that a unique actual personal entity cannot have actual plural components. He states that compounds such as horses exist objectively, but objective and real existing is divided into two kinds: dependent existence, and independent existence as a single real thing. Therefore, the two characteristics of "being a component" and "being independent" are incompatible and do not come together in a real being. Dashtaki has also quoted phrases from Bahmanyar to confirm his point of view. Bahmanyar says that the properties of an animal belong to the whole and compound, not to each component. For example, it is a horse that feels, not its bone or brain, as the eye is also a compound, but seeing is the work of the eye, not the work of any of its components. Therefore, the animal, which is something compound, has characteristics that none of its components have. So the animal is something over and above its components. Bahmanyar thinks the components in the animal are potential. Then he states a general rule: any compound in which unity is real, its components do potentially exist. Therefore, Bahmanyar considers the body parts of the living organism as a potential being and generally believes that the components of any compound that have true unity are potential. The potentiality of the components in a real compound does not that mean that the components are destroyed and a new thing is produced. The components are also available, but they do not have the effects they had separately before the composition comes into existence. In other words, the components have found a unique identity together and therefore have a new effect.. It seems that Bahmanyar has expressed the same idea that Dashtaki is looking for in the theory of unified composition. Therefore, it can be said that before Dashtaki, Bahmanyar has come up with the thought of a unity. Of course, Bahmanyar has not explained much about this, and Dashtaki is the first who has organized and completed this idea as a philosophical theory. (shrink)

Capital Redefined presents a unique perspective on the nature of “capital,” departing from the prevailing reductionist accounts. Hosseini and Gills offer an expanded perspective on Marxian value theory by addressing its main limitations and building their own integrative value theory. They argue that the current understanding of “value” must be re-examined and liberated from its subservient ties to capital while acknowledging the ways in which capital appropriates value. This is achieved by differentiating between “fetish value” created by capital and (...) “true value” generated through various commons-based forms of coexistence. The authors propose a defetishization of value by rejecting the commonly accepted idea of its objectivity. They introduce their “commonist value theory,” which redefines capital as both the product and process of perverting the fundamental commoning causes of true value into sources of fetish value. Capital is theorized through a “modular” framework, where multiple intersecting processes constitute a comprehensive power structure, a “value regime,” representing an unprecedented degree of the domination of capital over life. Their theory reconciles two apparently incompatible views on the notion of value. One view encompasses all inputs involved in capitalist value production and conflates intrinsic and commodity values. The other warns against this conflation as it treats capital as an entity tightly associated only with commodity production and wage labor. The authors believe that establishing alternative forms of value creation based on normative principles of living in commons is crucial as an analytical base for criticizing existing power structures and economic systems. The book offers a theoretical foundation for transforming our life worlds toward “post-capitalist” futures. It appeals to scholars and students in various fields, such as political economy, capitalism, and post-capitalist studies, economic and political sociology, globalization, development studies, social ecology, and ecological philosophy. The Open Access version of this book, available at taylorfrancis com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license. (shrink)

According to a bedrock assumption in the current methodology of armchair philosophy, we may refute a theory aiming at analyzing a concept by providing a counterexample in which it intuitively seems that a hypothetical or real situation does not fit with what the theory implies. In this paper, we shall argue that this assumption is at most either untenable or otherwise useless in bringing about what is commonly expected from it.

Recent years have seen a surge of attention to the problem of logical pluralism; most of which has been a reaction to Beall and Restall’s account of logical pluralism as the existence of more than one equally correct semantic relation of logical consequence. The underlying thesis is that the indeterminacy of the notion of validity goes beyond what the inductive-deductive distinction can precisify. The notion of deductive validity itself is indeterminate as well and this indeterminacy has its roots in the (...) indeterminacy of the more fundamental notion of case. Cases are what make the premisses and the conclusion of an argument true; the most notable example being Tarskian models for classical logic. Deductive validity is the preservation of truth across all cases. This paper argues that unless this account of logical pluralism is supplemented with an argument in favor of the equal legitimacy of the purported cases it becomes merely a semi-controversial exposition of how different logics can be generated. (shrink)

One of the most important questions in epistemology is the nonphysical realities, like phenomenal consciousness. The main claim of physicalism is real explanations of events and properties are only physical explanations and representationalists are agree too. Thus these realities can explained by the rule of biases of physical and objective events.On the other hand , phenomenalists maintain that conscious experiences and aspect of subjectivity of phenomenal consciousness are not. In this article I attempt formulated the problem of phenomenal consciousness based (...) on the Perspectival Subjectivity and next proposed the solutions of theories of representation of mind then declare objections on the theories of representation of mind. There is a question as can be the theory of representation of mind the frame for causal explanation of the problems of phenomenal consciousness? (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a conceptual model to improve moral sensitivity in human resource development (HRD) to assist human resource (HR) practitioners in contending with moral challenges in HRD. The literature on the relationship between ethics and HRD suggests that the organizational and employee development discipline deals with ethical issues at three different levels: Individual, organizational and communal, and international levels. In section I, we elaborate on moral challenges facing HRD. In section II, we conceptualize moral sensitive HRD, proposing (...) a conceptual model in virtue of some essential ethical theories and concepts that assist HRD in grappling with those problems. We will show how each theory and concept can help HRD to deal with relevant problems. In section III, we elaborate on practical approaches to implement moral sensitivity in HRD. We put forward some strategies that help HRD bring those theories and concepts to bear on the ethical problems facing this discipline. Finally, we discuss moral education through learning theories to cultivate moral concepts and ethical dimensions in HRD education. (shrink)

خواجه نصيرالدين طوسي در زمرة بزرگ‌ترين و پرنفوذترين عالمان مسلمان سدة هفتم هجري به شمار مي‌رود. بخش عمده‌اي آثار وي ناظر به آثار و آراء فخرالدين رازي و در دفاع از فلسفه و ارائة كلامي درست و متين تدوين شده است. خواجه علاوه بر كلام و فلسفه، آثار عرفاني نيز دارد. مشكل مطالة آثار وي اين است كه گاه وي در كلام به مطالبي معتقد شده و در فلسفه از آنها دست برداشته است. وي همچنين با پذيرش محوري‌ترين آموزة عرفان (...) اسلامي، از سطح فلسفة رايج نيز گذشته است. برخي معتقدند كه خواجه نصير نيز مانند عده‌اي ديگر از انديشمندان، دچار تحوّل فكري شده و اين اختلاف‌ها مربوط به دوران‌هاي گوناگون فعاليت علمي و معرفتي وي بوده است. اين مقاله نشان مي‌‌دهد كه خواجه نصير هم ‌زمان همة اين سطوح انديشه را داشته است و نمي‌توان او را دچار تحوّل فكري دانست. درحقيقت، سه سطح طولي انديشه خواجه، به ترتيب عبارتند از: كلام، فلسفه و عرفان. در اين مقاله، با ارائة نمونه‌هايي، وجود اين سه سطح در كار وي، اثبات شده است. (shrink)

حقايق اندماجي مقام ذات، حيثيات، احوال و صفات آن ذات بسيط اند. ازآنجا كه اين حقايق، تفصيل نيافته و تعينات ذات نيستند، در ذات مستهلك اند. حقايق اندماجي، كثرتي بالفعل را در ذات ايجاد نمي كنند و در غيب ذات، مخفي اند؛ يعني ظهور ندارند. اين حقايق، از جهت واحد بر ذات صادق اند، يعني حيثيات جهت واحد ذات هستند. عارفان مكتب ابن عربي، از واژگاني مانند استهلاك، اندماج، استجنان، اجمال، كمون و قوه، براي اشاره به اين حقايق استفاده كرده (...) اند. آنان تبيين هايي دربارة چگونگي حضور اين حقايق در متن ذاتي كه بدان موجودند، ارائه داده و از مثال هايي نيز براي دريافت بهتر آنها استفاده كرده اند. از نظرگاه عرفاني، اين حقايق را بايد داراي نحوه اي ويژه از موجوديت مجازي يا بالعرض دانست. اين نوشتار، از حقايق اندماجي با تأكيد بر مقام ذات بحث مي كند. كمالات و شئون ذاتي مقام ذات، مهم ترين مصداق حقايق اندماجي در عرفان محيي الديني هستند. اما اصل بحث عموميت دارد و دربارة ساير مصاديق اين حقايق نيز جريان دارد. (shrink)

Aristotle has repeatedly stated in his works that 'being has several senses'. Is this to be regarded as his pluralistic ontology, an approach that seems to be too nascent? If so, how can this newfound approach in ontology be linked to the ideas of the father of this science, i.e. Aristotle? These are the questions that the present article seeks to answer. First, we will show that Aristotle thinks of 'being' in four senses. Then, step by step he proceeds to (...) leave different senses aside, insofar as only one sense remains: being in the sense of the figures of the categories. We argue, then, that it is better to found Aristotle's ontological pluralism upon the fourfold sorts, instead of the tenfold categories. We will provide some reasons for this preference, i.e. in defense of the fourfold sorts and against the tenfold categories. Each of these four modes of being will be discussed. Finally, a version of ontological pluralism will be provided and attributed to Aristotle: Sorting Version. According to this version of pluralism, we will demonstrate how Aristotle speaks of the ontologically fundamental structure of the world. (shrink)

The relation between science and religion has been one of the most important disturbance of scientists in recent centuries. Expressing thus issue was started in west countries since renaissance seriously and it expanded to all countries even Islamic countries. Mesbah as a philosopher and an Islamic scientist chooses completion idea which is based on his basis; e.g. philosophical foundations with reasonable relativity, paradigm acceptance which means thought basis, experience acceptance which means revelation and inspiration by innocent, monopoly on legitimacy acceptance (...) with salvations pluralism and behavioral pluralism, general rules of conversation acceptance agreement and required backgrounds and transcendent wisdom. Also, Ian Barbour as a philosopher and a western physicist chooses compilation idea which is based on his basis; e.g. science and religion methodology parallelisms, critical realism, paradigm acceptance which means mindset, religious experience, religious pluralism, philosophic hermeneutic and scanning philosophy. Mesbah leads to separate levels of knowledge in case of its value recognizing and to accept that knowledge is multilevel and is necessary to face systematically in phenomena analysis, but Barbour works on relativity. (shrink)

Resenha do livro: "Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man" é uma obra de Seyyed H. Nasr que examina a crise espiritual enfrentada pelo ser humano moderno em relação à natureza. Nasr aborda a crescente desconexão entre o homem e a natureza devido à visão mecanicista predominante na sociedade moderna. O livro propõe uma visão alternativa que busca restaurar a harmonia entre o homem e a natureza. Com sua abordagem interdisciplinar, o livro desafia as concepções convencionais e (...) convida os leitores a refletir sobre a crise espiritual contemporânea e a buscar uma reconciliação significativa com o mundo natural. É uma leitura indispensável para quem se interessa por filosofia, ciência e meio ambiente. (shrink)

This thesis examines Mir-Hosseini’s hermeneutical strategies to reinterpret how Islam understands gender equality by evaluating whether she allows the text to speak or uses specific hermeneutical methods to create the desired egalitarian meaning. I argue that her strategies fail to succeed by examining her understanding of Qur’an 4:34, which she considers the linchpin to furthering gender oppression in Islam, by utilizing Aysha A. Hidayatullah’s work as a framework of examination. I evaluate the interpretive choices she uses to recover gender (...) equality in the Qur’anic and the hadith texts and show that her effort fails to show that the Islamic texts teach the gender equality she purports that they teach. (shrink)

This review is about some important ideas of famous Muslim philosopher, Avicenna about science and its philosophy on base of idea and works of Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr.

Art among Iranian and Islamic philosophers has always been associated with moral, so that many philosophers have considered art to be synonymous with virtue. By examining Farabi's opinions, it is possible to extract his special ideas about art and artist. In Farabi's theory of Virtuous Art, the artist is on the second floor of utopia and carries religious truths and reasonable happiness. Also, the theory of Virtuous Art has all the aesthetic features and artistic creativity, and in fact, all artistic (...) values are the presupposition of being an art of Virtuous Art. By reflecting on Suhrawardi’s numerous works and intellectual foundations, we can also see that he also paid special attention to the virtuous art and the supreme aspects of art; although he did not directly theorize about the basics of art, but by examining his theories, we can infer the basics of Ishraghi's Virtuous Art. Moreover, Suhrawardi has written some of his works in allegorical and artistic language, and this is a manifestation of Suhrawardi’s Illuminating Art. Among contemporary thinkers, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Titus Burckhardt have presented an approach with the title of Sacred Art, considering the sacred foundations of art and Traditionalism. (shrink)

The monopolistic tendency of modern science in asserting itself as the exclusive interpreter of the human psyche or mind through its psychology does so while negating the most crucial dimension that makes it a complete psychology, the metaphysical order as is found across the world in all times and places. The reductionistic turn of modern Western psychology away from its metaphysical roots has deformed the original “science of the soul” rendering it null and void. That spirituality and metaphysics have been (...) marginalized and deemed irrelevant in modern science was assumed to be the logical course of progress. Ironically, however, their fundamental absence is the reason contemporary psychology is in disarray. Numerous individuals may see this as preposterous and think that to suggest this is to turn back the clock to the dark ages of knowledge. However, if psychology is returned to its origin in metaphysics, sacred science, and spiritual principles, it can again become worthy of being called a “science of the soul.” This interview with Islamic philosopher, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, on the discipline of psychology explores the original meaning of the “science of the soul” as it is understood across the diverse cultures of the world. (shrink)

Attempts to resolve the problem of evil often appeal to a greater good, according to which God’s permission of moral and natural evil is justified because (and just in case) the evil that is permitted is necessary for the realization of some greater good. In the extensive litany of greater good theodicies and defenses, the appeal to the greater good of an afterlife of infinite reward or pleasure has played a minor role in Christian thought but a more important role (...) in Islamic thought. In a recent article, Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad invites us to reconsider a greater good theodicy of compensation. He contends that not only are all evils justified in that God compensates the sufferer in an afterlife, but because evils experienced produce some good, God has reason for bringing about or allowing evils in the first place (Mousavirad 211). In what follows I argue that this modified compensation theodicy is flawed in its premises, faces serious problems about its concept of justice, treats people as means only and not as intrinsically valuable, and ultimately fails to show that an afterlife compensation, along with some good produced here and now by evil, justify God bringing about or allowing evil. (shrink)

This essay responds to four critical essays by Rosemary Kellison, Ebrahim Moosa, Joseph Winters, and Martin Kavka on the author’s recent book, Healthy Conflict in Contemporary American Society: From Enemy to Adversary (Cambridge, 2018). Parts I and II work in tandem to further develop my accounts of strategic empathy and agonistic political friendship. I defend against criticisms that my argument for moral imagination obligates oppressed people to empathize with their oppressors. I argue, further, that healthy conflict can be motivated (...) by a kind of “secular” love. This enables my position to immanently criticize and mediate the claims that one must either love (agapically) one’s opponent in order to engage them in “healthy conflict,” on one hand, or that one must vanquish, exclude, or “cancel” one’s opponent, on the other. In Part III, I demonstrate how my account mediates the challenge of an alleged standing opposition between moral imagination and socio-theoretical critique. I defend a methodologically pragmatist account of immanent prophetic criticism, resistance, and conflict transformation. Finally, I respond to one critic’s vindication of a strong enemy/adversary opposition that takes up the case of white supremacist violence in the U.S. I argue that the time horizon for healthy conflict must be simultaneously immediate and also long-term, provided that such engagements remain socio-critically self-reflexive and seek to cultivate transformational responses. (shrink)

Herhangi bir şeyi, kendisi dışında başka bir şeyle belirtmek olarak tanımlanabilen metafor; İslâm coğrafyasında, özellikle tasavvuf ve sûfizm çalışmalarında, önemli bir ifade yöntemi olarak kullanılmaktadır. Spesifik olarak edebî hikâyelerin ifadelerine daha güçlü, vurgulu ve manidar bir anlatım katabilmek adına, filozoflar sembolik ya da metaforik anlatım ve ifadelerden faydalanmışlardır. İslâm filozoflarından, yoğun olarak bu ifade dilini kullananlar başta Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rumî olmak üzere; İbn Sînâ, Ahmed el-Gazâlî, Şehabeddîn Sühreverdî ve bu çalışmada üzerinde duracağım Mollâ Câmî (Mevlânâ Nureddîn Abdurrahîm el-Câmî)'dir. Mollâ Câmî; (...) Leyla ile Mecnun, Yûsuf ile Züleyha, Salaman ile Absal gibi derleme mesnevîleri İranlı klasik şairlerin sonuncusu sayılmasının yanı sıra Nefâhatü'l-üns kitabıyla birlikte tasavvuf felsefesinin de önemli kaynak ve bilginlerindendir. Bu çalışmada da Mollâ Câmî'nin eserlerinde bir ifade dili niteliğinde kullandığı metaforik anlatım ve ifadelere, bunların kullanım alanlarına, örneklendirmelerle değinilecektir. (shrink)

Are science and religion compatible when it comes to understanding cosmology (the origin of the universe), biology (the origin of life and of the human species), ethics, and the human mind (minds, brains, souls, and free will)? Do science and religion occupy non-overlapping magisteria? Is Intelligent Design a scientific theory? How do the various faith traditions view the relationship between science and religion? What, if any, are the limits of scientific explanation? What are the most important open questions, problems, or (...) challenges confronting the relationship between science and religion, and what are the prospects for progress? These and other questions are explored in Science and Religion: 5 Questions--a collection of thirty-three interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the world's most influential and prominent philosophers, scientists, theologians, apologists, and atheists. Contributions by Simon Blackburn, Susan Blackmore, Sean Carroll, William Lane Craig, William Dembski, Daniel C. Dennett, George F.R. Ellis, Owen Flanagan, Owen Gingerich, Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, John F. Haught, Muzaffar Iqbal, Lawrence Krauss, Colin McGinn, Alister McGrath, Mary Midgley, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Timothy O'Connor, Massimo Pigliucci, John Polkinghorne, James Randi, Alex Rosenberg, Michael Ruse, Robert John Russell, John Searle, Michael Shermer, Victor J. Stenger, Robert Thurman, Michael Tooley, Charles Townes, Peter van Inwagen, Keith Ward, Rabbi David Wolpe. (shrink)

21. yüzyılın üçüncü on yılının şafağında, insanlığın varlığı son derece tehlikeli hale geldi. Ormanlarımızı kesiyor, tatlı su akiferlerimizi tüketiyor ve hayati önem taşıyan topraklarımızı kaybediyoruz. Okyanuslarımızdaki yaşamı sıyırıp yerine yüz milyonlarca ton plastik atık koyuyoruz. Çevremizi toksik endüstriyel kimyasallarla dolduruyoruz. Kirliliğimiz, kıtalardaki yaşamın dokusunu parçalayan ısı dalgalarına, kuraklıklara ve vahşi yangınlara neden olan iklim değişikliğini tetikliyor. Ve dünyaya yeni nesiller getiriyoruz, onurlu bir varoluşun kaynaklarına erişmeye ihtiyaç duyan milyonlarca insan. Hayata yönelik tehditlerin kapsamı ve genişliği her geçen gün artmaktadır. Bu (...) sürdürülebilir bir kalkınma şekli değildir. -/- Hastalıklarımızın temel nedeni, yanlış bir düşünce tarzından kaynaklanır. Bu tam olarak ne anlama geliyor? bu, ruhsal doğamızı inkar ederken kendimizi esas olarak maddi varlıklar olarak düşündüğümüz anlamına gelir. Maddi varlıklar olarak var olduğumuzu ve başka bir şey olmadığını düşündüğümüz için öncelikle bedenlerimizi zararlardan korumaya ve maddi varlığımızı sürdürmeye önem veririz. Manevi doğamız, eğer hiç düşünülürse, fiziksel varlığımızın ikincil bir yönü olarak ele alınır - ciddiye alınmaması gereken bir şey. Bizim için önemli olan tek şey maddi dünyada ortaya çıkan fenomenlerdir - görülebilen, duyulabilen, dokunulabilen veya ölçülebilen şeyler, ancak duyularımızın bizi aldattığını biliyoruz, duyular beynin bir yapısıdır. . Gerçek bir dünya olarak kabul ettiğimiz şey bir yanılsamadır. Pozitivist ve materyalist düşüncenin tahakkümü mantıksızlığa ve yıkıma yol açar. -/- Peki bu yaklaşım bizi nereye götürdü? Bize bir mutluluk ve tatmin duygusu getirdi mi? Her günü neşeli bir işbirliği ruhu içinde, parlak umutlar ve mutlu beklentilerle dolu kalplerimizle yaşamak yerine, kendimizi diğerlerinden soyutladık ve onları rakip veya düşman olarak gördük. Düşüncelerimiz, sonsuz bir savaş, yoksulluk, açlık ve çevresel yıkım döngüsüne yol açan şüphe, korku ve açgözlülükle dolu. Yakında uyanmadıkça ve ruhsal doğamıza dikkat etmedikçe, Dünya'da insanlık için bir gelecek olmayacak. -/- Kelimeler hayattır. Kelimeler hafiftir. Kelimeler güçtür. Kelimeler enerjidir. Sözler gerçektir. Kelimeler canlandırabilir ve kelimeler de öldürebilir. Kelimeler umut verebilir veya bizi umutsuzluğa sürükleyebilir. İnsanlar barışı inşa etmek için kelimeleri, savaşmak için kelimeleri kullanırlar. Kelimeler kültürler, dinler ve milletler arasında duvarlar oluşturabilir. Ve kelimeler de köprüler kurabilir. Bir bireyin, bir ailenin, bir topluluğun, bir ülkenin ve gezegenimizin varlığı, konuştuğumuz kelimelerin gücüyle iyiye veya kötüye yönlendirilmektedir. Konuştuğumuz kelimeler bu dünyada olan her şeyden sorumludur. Bu nedenle, konuştuğumuz kelimelerden sorumlu olmalıyız. Gelecek nesiller adına, umarım her birimiz sadece parlak, ışık dolu sözler söylemek için elimizden gelen her şeyi yaparız, böylece bir gün torunlarımız ışıkla dolu bir dünyaya doğar. Kaybedecek vakit yok. Bu andan itibaren, umarım hepimiz kullandığımız kelimelere yakından bakar ve onları parlaklık ile doldurmak için sürekli çaba gösteririz. -/- Kimse bizim için hayatımızı değiştiremez. Kimse bizim için dünyayı değiştirmeyecek. Her birimizin, konuştuğumuz her kelimenin serbest bıraktığı olağanüstü, yaratıcı gücü tanımasının ve bilinçli olarak sadece şükran, teşvik ve iyi niyetle dolu kelimeleri konuşmanın zamanı geldi. Bu andan itibaren, kendimiz ve başkaları için sevgi ve bağışlama ile rezonansa giren kelimeleri seçelim. Sadece bir adım ileri gidersek bunu kesinlikle yapabiliriz. Her seferinde bir adım, her seferinde bir kelime, bilincimizdeki trajedi ve izolasyon tohumlarını söküp onları mutluluk ve uzlaşma dalgalarına dönüştürebiliriz. Kendimiz, Toprak Ana ve gelecek nesiller adına, insanlığın Dünya üzerindeki olumlu evrimine katkıda bulunan kelimeleri kullanalım. (shrink)

The paper presents a cognitive, educational and philosophical strategy, sometimes called reconstructionism (as it denotes e orts to reconstruct knowledge and science), proposed by a number of Muslim authors as a proper reaction to modern science. The pre‐modern background for this reaction is highlighted. Two examples are given: the Islamic science idea by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and the Islamization of knowledge project by Ismail Raji al‐Faruqi. Their critique of Euro‐Atlantic science is based on its perceived e ects on society (...) and morality (secularization, imperialism and colonialism, cruelty towards labora‐ tory animals, etc.) as well as on tawhid, the Islamic idea of unity. Their main postulates are to stop calling modern science objective and universal because this is a purely Western product; to produce an alternative indigenous science; to make science conform with Islamic doctrine and ethics; to reintroduce holism and sapiential aspects of knowledge into science. Critical voices, both Muslim and non‐Muslim, are quoted. All in all, reconstructionism is evaluated as a movement understandable to some extent but ine cient and idiosyncratic, unable to start objective and interesting research programmes on its own. (shrink)

In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, (...) presents the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology. (shrink)

In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, (...) presents the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology. (shrink)

Kant’ın (ö.1804) felsefesi eklektik bir felsefedir ve Aydınlanma felsefesinin devamı niteliğindedir. Aydınlanma felsefesine benzer şekilde felsefesinin temeli akıldır ve aklın sınırları ve kullanımı hakkında fikirler ileri sürmüştür. Kant, dini ele alırken Tanrı’nın varlığının saf akılla ispatlanamayacağı sonucuna varmıştır. Çünkü akılla yapılan ispatlarda Tanrı’nın varlığına getirilen deliller kadar yokluğuna da eşit derecede deliller getirilebilir. O nedenle Tanrı’nın varlığının ispatında saf aklın değil pratik aklın önemli olduğunu ve ahlâksal yasaların bizi Tanrı’nın varlığına götüreceğini ileri sürer. Bu görüşünü desteklemek için eserlerinde teistik delillerin (...) akla uygun olmadığını ve akılla bilinemeyeceğini ispatlamaya çalışmıştır. Ona göre ontolojik, kozmolojik, teleolojik.. vb. teistik delillerin işlevi zihni tanrıbilim için hazırlamaktan ibarettir. Fakat tek başına Tanrı’nın varlığını ispat etmekten uzaktır. Ontolojik delili Tanrı’nın varlığının ispatı ile ilgili belli bir felsefi delilin adı olarak kullanan ilk kişi 18.yy. filozoflarından Christian Wolff’tur (ö.1754). Ontolojik delil, diğer deliler gibi ‘olgulara dayalı’ değildir. Bu delil tamamen kavramsal ve a priori önermelere dayanır. Delil, Tanrı’nın doğrudan doğruya ve hiçbir vasıtaya gerek kalmadan bilineceği üzerine kurgulanmıştır. Tanrı’nın mükemmelliği, ‘Tanrı vardır’ önermesinin sadece düşünsel bir önerme mi yoksa dış varlığa karşılık gelen bir önerme mi olduğu, Tanrı’nın varlığının zorunluluğu meselesi ontolojik delil içinde tartışılan konulardır. Ontolojik delilde ‘Tanrı vardır’ önermesi a priori ve analitik bir önerme olarak kabul edilmektedir. Analitik önermeler ise Tanrı’nın varlığının zorunluluğunu gösterir. Kant’ın eleştirisine göre a priori kavramlar yoluyla her şeyi olanaklı düşünebiliriz ve bunun için zihnimizde herhangi bir sınırlama olamaz. Tanrı ve zorunlu varlık kavramlarını zihnimizde düşündüğümüz gibi Anka Kuşu, Kaf dağı, Pamuk Prenses..vb. kavramların da var olduğu düşünülebilir ve bizim düşünmemiz bunları zorunlu yapmaz, tıpkı Tanrı’yı düşündüğümüzde Tanrı’yı zorunlu var kılmadığı gibi. Bu bildiride Kant’ın düşüncesi ortaya konulduktan sonra onun düşüncesindeki tutarlılık ve tutarsızlıklara değinilecektir. Anka Kuşu, Kaf Dağı, Pamuk Prenses ..vb. gibi hayali kavramlarla Tanrı kıyaslanabilir mi? Biz hayali varlıkları zihnimizde oluştururken yine duyu verilerinden yararlanır ve dış dünyada gözlemlediğimiz canlılara benzer ‘hayali varlıklar’ üretiriz. Dış dünyada, kuş, dağ ve prenses vardır. Bizim tek yaptığımız bunu hayali adlar takmaktır. Fakat Tanrı söz konusu olduğunda dış dünyada gözlem yaparak bir Tanrı’ya şahit olmayız ve bu şahit olduğumuz Tanrı’ya benzer bir Tanrı’yı hayal ederek zihnimizde hayali bir varlık oluşturmayız. Tam tersine Tanrı kavramını zihnimizde oluştururken hiçbir şeye benzemeyen, sebebi olmayan, her şeyi varlığa getiren, mükemmel bir varlık çıkarımını akıl ve mantığımızın bizi götürdüğü sonuçla ortaya koyarız. Çünkü insan olarak biz birbirimize benzeriz, bizim bir sebebimiz vardır, hiçbir şey yaratamayız ve mükemmel değilizdir. Ve evrenin sonsuzluğu, yıldızlar, gezegenler, insanın biyolojik yapısı, matematiksel düzen bizi zorunlu olarak ‘sebebi olmayan mükemmel bir sebep’ aramaya iter. Ve Ontolojik Delil ortaya çıkar. Bu bakımdan Kant’ın eleştirisini kabul etmek mümkün değildir. (shrink)

Traditionalism-as a school established at 20th century by Rene Guenon, Amanda Coomaraswamy and expanding and developing by figures like Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Martin Lings, and Titus Burckhardt…- assumes human as vicegerent of God which has an important role in the universe. In this point of view Egalitarianism isn’t acceptable because human beings are different in respect of sexuality, emotions, talents and races. Differences between races and societies prove the necessity of religious plurality on one hand, and unity of the (...) Reality above the forms prove “Transcendence Unity of Religion” on the other. (shrink)